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Abstract
Surveillance studies suffer from a near-total lack of empirical data, partially due to
the highly secretive nature of surveillance programs. However, documents leaked by
Edward Snowden in June of 2013 provided unprecedented proof of top-secret American
data mining initiatives that covertly monitor electronic communications, collect, and store
previously unfathomable quantities of data. These documents presented an ideal
opportunity for testing theory against data to better understand contemporary
surveillance. This qualitative content analysis compared themes of technology, privacy,
national security, and legality in the NSA documents to those found in sets of publicly
available government reports, laws, and guidelines, finding inconsistencies in the portrayal
of governmental commitments to privacy, transparency, and civil liberties. These
inconsistencies are best explained by the risk society theoretical model, which predicts that
surveillance is an attempt to prevent risk in globalized and complex contemporary
societies.

Surveillance, Dataveillance, Data Mining, 9/11, Qualitative Content Analysis
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“Nothing in our past compares to the efforts at distributed mass-surveillance
that are now underway, which combine the long-standing police impulse to
expand private-sector information sources with awesome new technological
capabilities for vacuuming up, storing and keeping track of vast oceans of
information” (Stanley 2004:3).
“The greatest military power in history shields itself with an anti-missile
defense system costing billions of dollars. Is it not also a bitter irony that this
power should be struck to the heart of its security and self-confidence by an
action that was utterly improbable according to every logic of risk, when
suicide terrorists succeeded in turning commercial passenger aircraft into
rockets, which destroyed symbols of American world power? The irony of risk
here is that rationality, that is, the experience of the past, encourages
anticipation of the wrong kind of risk, the one we believe we can calculate and
control, whereas the disaster arises from what we do not know and cannot
calculate” (Beck 2006:330).

Introduction: The NSA Surveillance Programs and Surveillance Literature
On June 6, 2013, The Guardian published the first of numerous documents
demonstrating the breadth of the American National Security Administration’s (NSA)
previously top-secret mass data mining programs. These documents, made available by
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden and publicized by journalists Glenn Greenwald
and Laura Poitras, demonstrate the existence of secret electronic surveillance data mining
initiatives that use the cooperation of major Internet companies to gather information on
previously encrypted Internet communications, tap into vulnerable domestic and
international networks, and exploit technological innovations to collect and store
previously unfathomable amounts of information, all without traditional legal checks and
balances. The NSA’s programs were implemented in the wake of the September 11 terrorist
attacks and were ostensibly designed to prevent further terrorist plots. Revelations about
the programs have revivified debates about surveillance and privacy in the modern age and
provided the opportunity to empirically analyze contemporary surveillance. This study
used qualitative content analysis to compare themes within a sample of NSA documents to

those found in sets of laws, reports, and guidelines in order to test several hypotheses
about digital surveillance that were suggested by the literature. The literature review also
revealed a distinct lack of empirical data in contemporary surveillance literature, and this
study attempts to at least partially rectify that limitation.
Despite their lack of data, some common themes do emerge from surveillance
studies. They generally abound with theory, and they also tend to agree that surveillance
changed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Prior to those attacks, surveillance law in the
United States had remained relatively stable for decades (Henderson 2002). During those
same decades, technology proliferated, facilitating the transfer of information and making
communications exponentially more traceable. In the commercial sector, this meant that
the model for making money shifted as businesses moved online. In this new model, the
traceability of data is invaluable for marketers because the use of big data tracking
technology enables marketers to construct intricate profiles of consumers and precisely
target their messages to exactly the people that are most receptive to hearing it.
Contemporary government surveillance programs use big data in the same way as
marketers, constructing profiles of targets using data collected through their routine use of
technology.
Although technological advances made mass data collection possible, changes to the
legal system made by the PATRIOT Act enabled the NSA’s data mining programs. The Act,
drafted in 1995 but passed following the September 11 attacks, loosened restrictions on
surveillance of suspected terrorists. At the time it passed, scholars argued that it had the
potential to usher in an unrestricted executive surveillance power (Henderson 2002,
Stanley 2004). While the Act does contain provisions to protect privacy and in most
instances merely updated existing law, it has several controversial sections, Sections 203,
206, and 215 in particular. These sections, which amended the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), established in 1978 in order to limit “the ability of the executive
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branch to conduct electronic surveillance for national security purposes” (Henderson
2002:190), were all controversial at the time Act was passed because of the threat they
posed to individual privacy. The FISA Act established the FISA Court as way of subjecting
federal officers investigating secret and potentially sensitive targets to judicial supervision.
Originally, applications requesting electronic surveillance had to establish probable cause
“that the target was either a foreign power or the agent of a foreign power” (Henderson
2002:191) and that the locations of surveillance were used or were about to be used by the
target of surveillance. Judicial precedent also established that FISA evidence was only
admissible as criminal evidence if its collection was incidental to intelligence gathering:
“Information obtained pursuant to FISA could be used in criminal proceedings provided
that intelligence gathering was the ‘primary purpose’ of the surveillance” (Henderson
2002:195). All other evidence was subject to more stringent requirements laid out in Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III). Title III requires
probable cause for governmental interception of wire communications and also mandates
that “surveillance target[s] have, prior to the introduction of any damaging evidence in a
criminal proceeding, the opportunity to challenge both the existence of probable cause and
the conduct of the surveillance” (Henderson 2002:183). However, the PATRIOT Act
changed the protocols for conducting surveillance enough that it created loopholes that
enabled the government to collect data virtually unchecked.
The most controversial sections of the PATRIOT Act were set to expire 5 years after
passage of the Act, but have been renewed ever since. Section 203 enables government
agencies to share “foreign intelligence information” but “the definition of foreign
intelligence information is sufficiently broad that it encompasses virtually anything that
could be construed as a threat to national security, regardless of whether a U.S. person is
involved” (Henderson 2002:205). Section 206 gives the government power to engage in
roving surveillance without an obligation to prove that the target of surveillance even uses
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the device, enables data mining programs,. Section 215, provides “library records
permission,” which allows government access to materials potentially relevant to terrorist
investigations. These sections continue to be controversial because of their apparently
limitless scope. They also, by relaxing restrictions on surveillance, increase the likelihood of
monitoring innocent and untargeted individuals.
While many of actions taken following the 9/11 terrorist attack, including
detainment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, the invasion of Iraq, and the abuse of
prisoners of war were well-documented areas of public debate, there was scant evidence of
governmental surveillance. Certainly there was nothing like the comprehensive archive of
documents disclosed by Edward Snowden. While the exact number of leaked documents is
difficult to pinpoint, the NSA estimates that Snowden released 200,000 to 1.7 million
classified documents (Kelley 2013) to Poitras and Greenwald. Because of the secret nature
of the program, there had been no prior evidence of its size or scope. Now, a significant
number of the documents are readily available online, primarily through Glenn
Greenwald’s website The Intercept, but on other news sites as well.
The leaked NSA documents present the opportunity to empirically explore post9/11 surveillance in America. Most scholars agree that there was a shift in the nature of
surveillance following the attacks, but there has never been such an abundance of
documentation of that shift until now. Previously top secret, the NSA program has now
been so extensively documented—and the leaked documents made so readily available—
that it can serve as a benchmark to test theory against reality and more completely
understand contemporary surveillance. To that end, this study employs a comparative
qualitative content analysis to evaluate the NSA documents and better understand post9/11 surveillance in America within a sociological framework. Several hypotheses were
formed based on theoretical arguments found in surveillance studies, and themes within a
sample of the top-secret NSA documents were tested against themes found in sets of
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publicly available laws, guidelines, and reports as a method of understanding post-9/11
surveillance in America.

Theory
The literature did suggest several themes, and surveillance literature repeatedly
addresses key aspects of contemporary surveillance. One key aspect is the role that
technology plays in surveillance. The effect of technology on surveillance in contemporary
society has been of interest to surveillance scholars for some time, and visible changes in
monitoring—the increasing number of recording devices, unprecedented reliance on
personally identifiable data for verification, and corporate uses of surveillance—have been
used to form theories of surveillance. In the literature, technology is consistently presented
as an essential part of modern surveillance that makes surveillance almost unbelievably
easy, cheap, unobtrusive, and ubiquitous (Marx and Muschert 2007:380). Modern
technology has also allowed more flexible surveillance. Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V.
Ericson conceptualize modern surveillance as a “surveillant assemblage,” that uses imagery
that may be more appropriate for modern surveillance than even Foucault’s Panopticon.
The surveillant assemblage results from the convergence of previously discrete
surveillance systems that reduces individuals to a set of representative data that are then
analyzed (Haggerty and Ericson 2000:606). While this trend of networking is one of the
hallmarks of modern surveillance, information legitimately collected in one arena may
violate civil rights in another: “Practices that may in some respects be acceptable in one
[type of application] (say, marketing) may erode rights and deny human dignity in another
(say, anti-terrorism)” (Lyon 2014:2).
Most surveillance studies adhere to a postmodernist paradigm, and
As understood by postmodernists, power is not a top-down, structural entity,
possessed and wielded exclusively by elites. Rather, it comes from everywhere, even below,
and is exercised rather than owned (Foucault 1989:177). The majority of surveillance work
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also owes a debt to Michel Foucault. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault addresses the
processes that create power, principally discourse and knowledge, also discussing how
both power and discipline are exercised through a variety of techniques, including
surveillance (Foucault 1989:27). Technology is suspicious because it not only aids this
surveillance, but also because it is a tool of power with the potential to oppress and control,
a theme that also frequently appears in surveillance literature (Haggerty and Ericson 2000;
Lyon 2004, 2007, 2014; Mann 2012; Willcocks 2006). Foucault’s metaphor of the
Panopticon also has implications for many areas of interest to surveillance scholars,
including those of dominance, control, and power.
Foucault’s Panopticon metaphor demonstrates the necessity of surveillance in
disciplinary society: “Hierarchized, continuous and functional surveillance may not be one
of the great technical 'inventions' of the eighteenth century, but its insidious extension
owed its importance to the mechanisms of power that it brought with it” (Foucault
1989:176). The brilliance of the Panopticon, a 19th century model prison, as a metaphor is
the structure’s efficient consolidation of power and control. The Panopticon’s raised central
tower presented the constant threat of surveillance by unseeable guards. The prison
population internalized the surveillance they were subjected to and effectively policed
themselves, internalizing external methods of control regardless of whether a guard was
actually present. This, Foucault says, is why surveillance is so effective, not only in prisons
but in schools, factories, and even society at large. Calling it a “multiple, automatic, and
anonymous power,” Foucault outlines its efficiency: “Its functioning is that of a network of
relations from top to bottom but also to a certain extent from bottom to top and
laterally...The power in the hierarchized surveillance of the disciplines is not possessed as a
thing, or transferred as a property; it functions like a piece of machinery” (Foucault
1989:176-177).
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Modern surveillance does mimic the Panopticon in several ways. As in the
Panopticon, contemporary individuals/consumers willingly facilitate their own
surveillance. Willcocks (2006) emphasizes that those under surveillance in modern
Information/control society submit to the disciplinary power exercised through
technological surveillance and internalize its control over them. Furthermore, a relatively
small portion of the population enacts this surveillance; the rest of the population lacks the
means to see reciprocally into the workings of the institutions that monitor their activities.
Privacy laws increasingly distinguish between data collected on a person and personal
identity (Lyon 2004), information is a commodity (as in Foucault’s writing people became
objects) and consumers are increasingly willing to leverage their data for perceived
rewards (Campbell and Carlson 2002). Just as prisoners in the Panopticon began to believe
discipline was good for them, modern consumers accept that they are justly compensated
for the sacrifice of their personal information (Lyon 2004, Campbell and Carlson 2002),
which is accomplished, as Foucault predicted, by coercion so subtle it is not even felt: “The
contemporary Panopticon…is a consumer Panopticon based on positive benefits where the
worst sanction is exclusion” (Campbell and Carlson 2002:592). People accept new
technology as so essential to their own happiness and self-identity that they willingly
submit to surveillance.
Despite the appeal of the disciplinary model, most contemporary surveillance
scholars point to its shortcomings and have expanded and altered Foucault’s original
theory to better tailor it to current surveillance. The risk society and control society
models, for instance, are both rooted in postmodernist theory but are distinct and more
contemporary sociological frameworks that explain many aspects of present-day society,
including increasing carceral rates, class inequality, and social monitoring that
disproportionately affects lower classes, particularly in Western societies that boast
relatively high levels of security and stability. Foucault’s disciplinary model predicted that
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these social ills would dissipate in the face of more subtle and internalized civility, and
more recent theoretical models all seek to explain what actually happened.
Benoit Dupont argues that there are, “Several architectural incompatibilities
between nineteenth century prisons and twenty-first century computer networks…The
distributed structure of the Internet and the availability of observation technologies has
blurred the distinction between those who watch and those who are being watched”
(Dupont 2008:259). Dupont identifies two principle trends frequently minimized or
neglected by surveillance scholars that deserve more scrutiny: the “democratization of
surveillance” and the “resistance strategies” Internet users have and are adopting to thwart
this surveillance (Dupont 2008:261). Unlike the Panopticon, which by definition utilizes a
central hub to enact its surveillance, the Internet was designed to be amorphous and
decentralized, in order to make it resilient. This design creates an openness paradox:
“while the technical protocols that underpin the Internet are public and standardized,
therefore making surveillance relatively easy to carry out, the very same openness
empowers application writers (programmers), who are free to design and distribute new
tools of surveillance and resistance” (Dupont 2008:261). In addition, cheap surveillance
software and hardware is marketed to individuals; the combination of this accessible
surveillance technology with the proliferation of affordable and free tools for blocking
surveillance and masking Internet activity has the potential to create unprecedented
possibilities for citizen rebellion (Dupont 2008). However, the existence of resistance
strategies does not equate to their widespread use, and their complexity often makes them
difficult for average users (Greenwald 2014:7-33).
The study tests two prevailing models of modern surveillance society suggested in
the literature: the control society model and the risk society model. Control societies
operate much like modern surveillance society, using technology and the availability of
data rather than prison to exert control over populations: “Control societies no longer
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operate, by for example, physically confining people but through continuous control and
instant communication enabled by developments in material technology (Willcocks
2006:4). A crucial difference between disciplinary and control societies is that surveillance
has moved from observation of specific populations to almost haphazard collection of data
in the quest for relevant information (Lyon 2014:2). Because of the volume of data
collection, in control societies physical confinement is no longer necessary to control
society, since the threat of surveillance is felt through the perception of ubiquitous data
collection (Deleuze 1992:7). Still, the control society model evolved from the disciplinary
model, and the two are similar. For instance, both caution against understanding power (in
this case exercised through surveillance) as a top-down, hierarchical venture:
“Understanding surveillance in the 21st century also entails an analytic move beyond the
conventional loci of power—the state or the corporation—to discover ways in which all
sorts of processes, procedures, strategies and tactics help to shape relations and enable or
constrain activities touched by globalized flows of personal data, from international to local
community levels” (Lyon 2004:146). In control societies, factories have been replaced by
corporations, and competition between individuals and corporations is presented as
healthy and natural, thereby keeping these entities focused on each other, rather than
mechanisms of control (Deleuze 1992:5). Control societies are also distinguished from
disciplinary societies by the use of codes; disciplinary societies use numbers or signatures
to de-individuate people (Deleuze 1992:5). While several aspects of the control society
model preliminarily appeared to be relevant to contemporary dataveillance, there also
appear to be discrepancies between that model and contemporary society.
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Loic Wacquant proposes that incarceration rates are actually indicative of another
kind of control in this country. While the disciplinary and control society models both
predict that surveillance will minimize the need for physical incarceration, Wacquant calls
incarceration a method of “punitive containment,” not an inexplicable accident, but rather a
deliberate attempt to contain the increasing number of people marginalized by neoliberal
policies. He factors modern surveillance and data collection into his argument, and agrees
with the control society model that both are used to control the increasing number of
marginalized citizens in neoliberal societies. He points out a seeming contradiction: In an
increasingly stratified and globalized society, the privileged minority of citizens enjoy
increased laxity—deregulated financial systems and low rates of prosecution for white
collar crimes---while impoverished populations are subjected to escalating police
surveillance and incarceration in place of social assistance programs that were eliminated
in the neoliberal era (Wacquant 2010). Wacquant therefore repudiates the disciplinary
model. Contemporary prisons, he says, serve only to contain undesirable populations:
“Hierarchical classification, elaborate time schedules, nonidleness, close-up examination
and the regimentation of the body: these techniques of penal ‘normalization’ have been
rendered wholly impracticable by the demographic chaos spawned by overpopulation,
bureaucratic rigidity, resource depletion, and the studious indifference if not hostility of
penal authorities toward rehabilitation” (Wacquant 20120:205).
The risk society model portrays different motives for modern surveillance than both
Wacquant and control society theorists, and states that data collection is not an attempt to
control society but rather prevent future disasters. They even question the possibility of
control in contemporary society, given the pace of technology, globalization, and inequality:
“World risk society theory does not plead for or encourage (as some assume) a return to a
11

logic of control in an age of risk and manufactured uncertainties—that was the solution of
the first and simple modernity. On the contrary, in the world risk society the logic of
control is questioned fundamentally, not only from a sociological point of view but by
ongoing modernization itself” (Beck 2000:218). Beck (2000; 2006) argues that risk in
contemporary society has become inescapable. Data mining programs, which use actuarial
models to predict risk, reflect larger societal trends, “combin[ing] a neoliberal
disappointment in welfare-state objectives of totalizing transformations with an optimistic
belief in the ability of information and technology to produce a risk-free society” (Amoore
and De Goede 2005:150). While the disciplinary model targets individuals for reform,
thereby creating an individuated and normalized society, risk management individuates
characteristics within individuals, turning people into what Lyon calls “data doubles” and
what Amoore and De Goede refer to as “a set of measurable risk factors” (Amoore and De
Goede 2005:150). In risk societies, science only confirms peoples’ feeling that risk is
everywhere and danger is imminent, while denials of both risk and responsibility for risk
only exacerbate danger, as when both climate change and responsibility for climate change
are denied. Founded on an impossibility—the ability to predict the future—risk societies
are full of ironies like this one.
The emphasis on prediction in risk society constitutes a break from the type of
policing that has traditionally taken place in the United States and other democracies: “Big
data reverses prior policing or intelligence activities…Now bulk data are obtained and data
are aggregated from different sources before determining the full range of their actual and
potential uses and mobilizing algorithms and analytics not only to understand a past
sequence of events but also to predict and intervene before behaviors, events, and
processes are set in train” (Lyon 2014:4). This shift in criminal justice has major
implications for individual citizens, particularly when they are unable to contribute to the
process. (Lyon 2014:4). Predictive policing is also inconsistent, and statistics demonstrate
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the ineffectiveness of attempting to predict crimes: “Criminological research showing that
no method of prediction achieved more than a 50 per cent success rate in predicting
dangerousness” (Zedner 2005:512). Meanwhile, the sacrifice of civil liberties for security
fundamentally alters the country that is being protected (Beck 2006:330).
In both risk and control societies, surveillance is a fundamental part of society, a
necessity for rational government and modern nation states: “Surveillance is a condition of
modernity, integral to the development of disciplinary power and new forms of
governance. It has been essential to the development of the nation state, to global
capitalism and to the decentered forms of disciplinary power and ‘governmentalities’
inherent within modern societies” (Bennett 2012:485). Tokens like passwords and pin
numbers that are used to establish trust and navigate the modern individuated and virtual
world all create trails and establish searchable databases that enable digital surveillance,
and the technology that facilitates surveillance is increasingly inescapable (Lyon 2002,
2004, 2007; Marx and Muschert 2007).
One potential problem with its ubiquity is the effect that surveillance has on social
structures. Wacquant addresses this in his discussion of disparate surveillance tactics for
rich and poor populations. Lyon, too, points to the potential new forms of surveillance have
for stratifying society. Discussing the increase of state surveillance following the 9/11
terrorist attacks, he states, “The quality of social existence in a globalizing world is affected
directly by the automated identification and social sorting systems that proliferate both at
territorial borders and within the routines of everyday life” (Lyon 2002:162). While he
primarily deals with airport screening measures enacted following 9/11, he also makes it
clear that the potential for social sorting applies to all forms of modern surveillance
dependent on automated identification, risk management and categorization: “New
electronic infrastructures for risk management, deployed in the cause of security, often
reflect particular priorities and long-term social, economic, and cultural divisions…Within
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these, categories of suspected terrorist and illegal worker, resident and claimant loom
large” (Lyon 2002:163). Different social classes are also subjected to different types of
surveillance, the effects of which are not equally felt. Thin surveillance “monitors
movement and transactions (e.g., as with cell phones or credit cards) generally without
constraining mobility, whereas [thick surveillance] refers to confinement delineated and
frequently fortified spaces” (Marx and Muschert 2007:380). These types of surveillance are
generally directed at different social groups, exacerbating patterns of inequity: “While poor
individuals may be in regular contact with the surveillance systems associated with social
assistance or criminal justice, the middle and upper classes are increasingly subject to their
own forms of routine observation, documentation and analysis” (Haggerty and Ericson,
2000:618). Although thin surveillance tends to affect more affluent people with access to
credit cards and technology, thin surveillance tends to be more superficial and less invasive
than thick surveillance (Torpey 2007:116).
Preliminary data also indicates the potential for social stratification as a result of
modern surveillance. Conducting telephone interviews of 2,400 randomly selected, noninstitutionalized adults, Best and Kreuger studied perceptions of online surveillance and
the perceived sensitivity of certain search terms mentioning key political figures. While
they found that a majority of the public felt that they were subject to surveillance. The
participants also thought that violent as well as merely oppositional political activity
increased the likelihood of surveillance, political and demographic characteristics were
predictors for online surveillance perceptions. Individuals with lower income and lower
education levels were the most likely to perceive monitoring. They suggest that
perceptions of online surveillance affect online political activity. Therefore, two of the most
politically underrepresented groups may be most affected by online surveillance (Best and
Kreuger 2008:205).
14

Data on more traditional forms of surveillance indicates that it has the potential to
suppress even legal dissent and political activity. Conducting 20 individual and group
interviews in each of five different geographical regions, Fernandez et al. found that
surveillance suppressed and modified political dissent, discouraging people from
participating in even legal protests (Fernandez et al. 2006:11). However, there is
conflicting evidence about the impact of perceived government surveillance on political
participation. In an earlier study in which he used, “an ordered probit model of the online
participation scale using perceived government Internet surveillance and support for the
war in Iraq and an interaction term of these two variables” (Kreuger 2005:443), Kreuger
found that people who were strongly opposed to the Iraq War and most confident that the
government monitors Internet activity were also the most likely to be politically active
online (Kreuger 2005:446). However, he also cautioned against confusing cause with effect,
as people predisposed to being more politically active may also be more aware of
surveillance attempts, stressing that awareness of surveillance is only one in a number of
predictors of political participation.
Its other noteworthy traits aside, contemporary surveillance is, first and foremost,
unprecedented. The events of the early 2000s coincided perfectly to enable modern
American surveillance: 9/11 happened as technology evolved, and the PATRIOT Act was
passed to allow the government to capitalize on the ability of new technology to capture
previously unimagined amounts of data. The several theories that explain contemporary
surveillance have very little data to support them. Although the discipline of surveillance
studies is developing rapidly, and the existence of post-9/11 surveillance is often
discussed, there is still a lack of empirical data. Precisely because of this dearth of concrete
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information, modern surveillance studies themselves are an example of the risk model.
There is abundant discussion of risks and what they could mean but scant empirical
research that actually confirms or disproves this research. In the absence of data, all theory
is equal, and modern surveillance is yet another incalculable risk. The NSA Program
therefore provides an opportunity to test theory against reality, and to discard hypothetical
theorizing in favor of what can more nearly be called facts.

Questions
This study addressed the lack of empirical data in surveillance studies. The topsecret NSA surveillance documents provided an opportunity to compare those documents
to publicly available government materials, divided into sets of reports, laws and
guidelines. This study investigated six hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The NSA documents will display different themes than the reports,
laws, and guidelines.
Hypothesis 2: The reports and guidelines will be thematically consistent.
Hypothesis 3: The laws will be thematically consistent with the reports and
guidelines.
Hypothesis 4: The control society theoretical model predicts that data collection will
be haphazard, corporations and competition will play a prominent role in surveillance,
codes will be used to de-individuate targets of surveillance, and the intent of surveillance is
to control populations.
The risk society theoretical model predicts that data collection will be actuarial and
precise, based on risk models and focused on risk prevention.
The risk society theoretical model is the best theoretical explanation of post-9/11
surveillance, as represented by the NSA’s surveillance program.
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Research Design
This study used a qualitative research design. Creswell defines qualitative research
as “an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups
ascribe to a social or human problem. The process of research involves emerging questions
and procedures, data typically collected in the participant’s setting, data analysis
inductively building from particulars to general themes, and the researcher making
interpretations of the meaning of the data” (Creswell 2014:4). More than quantitative
research, qualitative research is interested in understanding and interpreting intent and
meaning (Morgan 2014:49). It often focuses on a specific event, situation, or set of people
and “relies on a holistic approach that examines as many of the relevant elements as
possible (Morgan 2014:50). The specific situation studied in this study is the NSA’s
surveillance program in order to understand the intent and meaning of that program
within existing surveillance literature.

Methods
To qualitatively understand the intent and meaning of the NSA’s surveillance
program, this study analyzed sets of documents using a comparative content analysis.
Content analysis developed in the early twentieth century and is used across a range of
disciplines for systematic analysis of communicative material (Flick et al. 2004:265). While
this study looked only at texts, content analysis can analyze any documented
communication. Although content analyses can also be quantitative, qualitative content
analyses deal with the meaning, rather than simply the technical attributes, of documents.
Qualitative content analysis involves several steps in which codes are used to establish
meaning in documents and establish themes: “This sort of qualitative data analysis is a
series of alternating inductive and deductive steps, whereby data-drive inductive
hypothesis generation is followed by deductive hypothesis examination, for the purposes of
verification” (Punch 2009:173) Codes label pieces of data within documents to attach
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meaning to pieces of data, thereby abstracting the large amounts of data that often
characterize qualitative studies to sets of themes that can be compared to each other
(Punch 2009:176). In a content analysis, deductive codes are suggested by the literature
review, and inductive, or emergent codes, emerge from preliminary analysis of the data
with the deductive codes.
To understand which surveillance theory best explains the surveillance exhibited in
the NSA documents, this study also used a grounded theory analysis: “The ultimate idea in
discovering a grounded theory is to find a core category, at a high level of abstraction but
grounded in the data, which accounts for what is central in the data “ (Punch 2009:183).
Grounded theory analysis was appropriate because, although three existing theoretical
models were considered, none was rooted in empirical data, and so this study was, in a
sense, grounding existing theory. To create grounded theory, conceptual categories in the
data are identified, relationships between these categories are established, and these
relationships are conceptualized and accounted for at an even higher level of abstraction
(Punch 2009:183).

Data
The data in this study consist of 9 public, official privacy documents (3 laws, 4 reports
and 2 guidelines) and a convenience sample of 63 NSA documents. The public documents
were selected to provide an overview of changes in surveillance from the 1974 Privacy Act
to the 2014 report prepared at the direction of President Obama following the Snowden
leaks. These documents were specifically referred to in the literature, or referred to by
other documents already included in the study. The OECD guidelines were included to
represent international standards for privacy, and the other documents were written for a
specifically American audience. Due to the volume of the Snowden leaks, those documents
were selected based on apparent relevance to the research questions as well as their
representativeness of the larger leak.
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•

The Privacy Act of 1974, Title 5: This act established a code of Fair Information
Practice that governs federal agencies’ use of and access to personal records (HHS
2014). Title 5 mandated the creation of the Privacy Commission and contains these
Fair Information Principles.

•

Privacy Commission Report, 1977: Established in Section 5 of the 1974 Privacy
Act, the Privacy Commission was created to make recommendations for the
implementation of the Privacy Act. The report made 162 recommendations, none of
which were passed by Congress.

•

Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986: Revising federal wiretapping
and electronic eavesdropping laws, the ECPA expanded protections for citizens’
phone conversations. The act also includes the Wiretap Act, the Stored
Communications Act, and the Pen-Register Act. The Stored Communications Act
regulates access to stored information sites and is usually applied to electronic
communications.

•

OECD Privacy Guidelines, 1981: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) recommended guidelines for member nations to “harmonize”
privacy legislation (OECD 2013).

•

The PATRIOT Act, 2001: Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the
Bush Administration introduced the USA PATRIOT Act, which stands for “Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism.” The act has been criticized for its scope and lack of checks
and balances. Sections 203 and 901 in particular enable mass data mining and
storage. (ACLU 2011).

•

“Safeguarding Privacy” in the Fight Against Terrorism: Report of the
Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee. Executive Summary, 2004: This
is a report on one of NSA’s predecessors, the Terrorist Information Awareness
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program (TIA) ordered by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to address
concerns about legality and privacy protection.
•

NSA documents, 2007-2013: These documents, demonstrating both the existence
and scope of the National Security Administration’s previously top-secret data
mining programs, were leaked by whistleblower Edward Snowden in 2013. The
exact size of the leak is difficult to pinpoint, with the NSA offering estimates that
range from 200,000 to 1.7 million classified documents (Kelley 2013). This study
analyzed a convenience sample of 63 internal documents from a range of different
surveillance programs.

•

Cybersecurity legislative proposal fact sheet, 2009: “The latest achievement in
the steady stream of progress we are making in securing cyberspace,” this
legislation was introduced by the Obama administration to protect American cybersecurity (The Whitehouse, 2009). This fact sheet reports the Administration’s
motives for the proposal, which amend laws related to cybersecurity.

•

Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A framework for protecting
privacy and promoting innovation in the global digital economy, 2012: This
consumer privacy Bill of Rights was issued by President Obama.

•

Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values, 2014: Following the
Snowden leaks in 2013, President Obama ordered a comprehensive review of Big
Data surveillance and processing, the findings of which this report documents.

Analysis
The documents were coded using MAXQDAPlus, professional software for
qualitative and mixed data analysis. The program helps organize documents and media and
provides a variety of ways to code documents for key phrases, concepts, and ideas.
Inductive codes, suggested by the research, included “surveillance,” “legal,” “privacy,”
“terrorism,” “technology,” “big data,” and “national security.” Deductive codes resulting
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from document review and preliminary analysis included “protecting our way of life,”
“accountability,” “transparency,” “oversight,” “challenges,” and “cooperation and
standardization.” These codes were applied to segments of text that were analyzed for
meaning and compared to other similarly coded segments.
The documents were coded in steps. The laws, reports, and guidelines were all
coded as individual sets, using the deductive codes to build themes. They were then coded
again with inductive codes, and the preliminary themes—“technology,” “national security,”
“protecting privacy,” “legal,” and “economic” were compared across these sets of public
documents. The NSA documents were then coded as their own set, using deductive coding
and then inductive coding, to identify emergent themes. Finally, the secret NSA documents
were compared to the public documents to compare themes of the public laws, reports, and
guidelines to the internal, secret NSA documents. Based on this analysis, four final themes
emerged: “Technology as Facilitator,” “Protecting America with Big Data,” “The Legality of
Dataveillance,” and “Protecting Privacy.” These themes were then compared across
document categories. Validity and reliability was established using a number of safeguards,
including several rounds of coding by the researcher and external review by scholars
familiar with surveillance to establish face validity.
There were several advantages to using MAXQDAPlus for this type of comparative
content analysis. It allowed the documents to be organized into sets, and its document
browser made it easy to switch between documents. In addition, it organized the codes
within a code system. Names of codes and themes could be changed easily, and allowed the
researcher to see which codes appeared in which documents at a glance. It color-coded
thematic groups, and highlighted the codes with these same colors within the documents.
However, while MAXQDA facilitated the analysis, it did not actually perform the analysis.
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Fig 1. MAXQDA window, showing the document browser in the right large frame, with a section of coded text
highlighted. The top left frame shows the documents, separated into sets of laws, guidelines, reports, and NSA
documents. The bottom left frame shows the code system, separated into color-coded themes (“technology as
facilitator,” “protecting america with big data,” and “legality of dataveillance” are shown.)

Results
The analysis demonstrated inconsistencies between the reports, laws, and
guidelines and the NSA document
documents categories. While all of the documents indicated
indicate that a
confluence of technological advances and desire for protection led to the creation of the
NSA’s data mining surveillance programs, intent wass inconsistently portrayed across the
document categories. While the NSA documents demonstrated an interest in legality, they
also revealed an opaque wing of government not subject to traditional oversights that
views any collection limitation as a shortcoming to be overcome through the use of
evolving technology. Meanwhile, tthe reports and guidelines, and to a lesser extent the laws,
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emphasized the importance of protecting individual data privacy, limiting data collection,
and preserving government transparency. The reports and guidelines also tempered their
discussions of technology and data collection with conversations about the importance of
protecting privacy and constitutional freedoms, presenting data and new technology as
tools to help the government carry out its job. Those same documents also weighed the
potential benefits of data collection against the risks they pose to these liberties. National
security was presented as a motivation for data collection, but it was only one of a number
of motives, and the reports and guidelines also listed a number of other ways that big data
could be used to protect the American way of life, discussing ways to protect privacy in the
face of evolving and escalating technological capabilities.
The NSA documents also demonstrated a number of motives for data collection, but
not all of these were consistent with the motivations presented in the reports, laws, and
guidelines. The NSA documents portrayed use and collection limitations as obstacles to be
overcome rather than fundamental privacy protections and the invasive nature of the
surveillance programs was specifically targeted to circumvent user control and overcome
privacy protections like encryption. While the public documents emphasized the
importance of transparency, the NSA technicians reported only to superiors within the
department, there was no evidence of external oversight. Additionally, while terrorists
were indeed targets of investigation, other countries and NGO’s were also targeted for data
collection for economic and political reasons. Furthermore, although the reports and
guidelines advocated removing the legal “line at the border,” which treats foreign nationals
differently from U.S. citizens, the NSA documents demonstrate their programs’ continued
use of such distinctions. Finally, contrary to the public documents, discussions in the NSA
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documents of benefits and challenges related to technology only pertained to collection
limitations, and not potential infringement of individua
individual liberties.
The changes the PATRIOT Act made to the legal system, coupled with technological
advancement, demonstrably allowed the creation of the NSA surveillance programs, and
terrorist threats were used as the justification for those changes. Te
Terrorism,, contrary to
expectation, was only mentioned in two of the public documents, an absence made more
conspicuous by the frequency with which it was mentioned in those two documents,
“Safeguarding Privacy,” and the P
PATRIOT Act. The PATRIOT Act invoked terrorists
terrori and
terrorism 237 times in the course of amending privacy and surveillance law, in itself an
unprecedented justification for changing in legal doctrine. As a whole, the documents
analyzed in this study demonstrated that technological advances, coupled with a tenuous
social situation that allowed unprecedented changes to the legal system, allowed the
creation of the NSA’s surveillance programs, which operate in a manner inconsistent with
public portrayals of American government.

Technology as Facilitator

Fig. 2:: The theme of technology as a facilitator of mass data mining programs across the document categories
used in this study. Discussions of the characteristics of technology were consistently represented across the
document categories, but discussions of benefits and challenges in the NSA documents were technical in the
NSA documents and focused on social repercussions in the reports and guidelines.
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Discussions of technology were ubiquitous across the document categories,
emphasizing the unprecedented nature of modern technology, its ubiquity in
contemporary life, and the rapid pace at which it evolves. Technology was an inductive
code, but several deductive codes were generated by the data, including those that spoke to
the characteristics of contemporary technology, like “unprecedented,” “ubiquity,” and
“escalation.” Discussions of the social effects of technology were also prevalent, and led to
the creation of the “benefits” and “challenges” codes. The NSA documents contained the
most technical information, while the other three document categories discussed the
characteristics of modern technology and the legal, social, and economic impacts of these
technologies. However, only two reports, “Safeguarding Privacy” in the Digital Age, and the
Big Data Report, explicitly referenced the properties of technology. The Cybersecurity
Legislative proposal pertained to issues resulting from new technology, but discussed
economic and national security issues and took the presence of technology as a fact (The
White House 2011). The Privacy Protection Study Commission Report, meanwhile,
predated modern technological issues. The remaining reports, guidelines, and to a much
lesser extent laws, primarily dealt with the characteristics, uses and challenges of “Big
Data.” Altogether, discussions of technology throughout the documents led to the creation
of the first theme, that of Technology as a Facilitator of post-9/11 surveillance.
While technology facilitated the creation of the controversial NSA surveillance
programs, appropriate governmental uses of technology were frequently discussed in the
laws, reports, and guidelines. The Privacy Act stated that, “All agencies should use modern
technology to inform citizens about what is known and done by their Government,” adding
that, “Disclosure should be timely.” (Privacy Act 1974:44) The PATRIOT Act also referred to
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the governments’ use of technology. However, rather than using technology to extend
privacy and government transparency, the PATRIOT Act described technologies that
should be created in order to properly execute the law (USAPATRIOT 2001:73). The Big
Data Report, on the other hand, pointed to many governmental, corporate, and individual
uses of modern technology. A frequent theme in that document was Obama
Administration’s use of data. That use is referred to as a “harnessing” of technology. This is
something the Obama Administration has evidently made a priority: “Since the earliest
days of President Obama’s first term, this Administration has called on both the public and
private sector to harness the power of data in ways that boost productivity, improve lives,
and serve communities.” (Executive Office of the President 2014:9) While the report
discussed ways in which the administration has used technology to extend transparency, it
also touched on the potential drawbacks of modern technology, an issue also discussed in
other reports and guidelines, but entirely neglected in the NSA documents.
One reason the NSA programs are so unique is that technology itself evolves so
rapidly and outpaces the legal system’s efforts to check it. The laws, guidelines, and reports
all stressed the unprecedented qualities of contemporary technology, and the potential
problems these qualities create; the “unprecedented” code explained changing privacy
norms, regulations, and shortcomings. The ECPA, Privacy Act, and the PATRIOT Act were
all prompted at least in part by advances in technology that necessitated updates to
existing legal frameworks. The OECD guidelines also focused on the use of technology as
unprecedented: “Over the last three decades, personal data have come to play an
increasingly important role in our economies, societies and everyday lives. Innovations,
particularly in information and communication technologies, have impacted business
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operation, government administration, and the personal activities of individuals” (OECD
2013:19).
The reports referred to these same qualities, and the increasing importance of
technology in contemporary society. The Big Data report repeatedly referred to the
“transformative” and rapidity of developing technologies while also pointing to the
ubiquity of new technology and the data it generates: “The information age has
fundamentally reconfigured how data affects individual lives and the broader economy.
More than 6,000 data centers dot the globe. International data flows are continuous and
multidirectional. To a greater degree than ever before, this data is being harnessed by
businesses, governments, and entrepreneurs to improve the services they deliver and
enhance how people live and work” (Executive Office of the President 2014:48). In addition
to the reports and laws, the guidelines also indicated that the nature of new technology is
unprecedented. The Consumer Privacy guidelines referred to the ways in which modern
data is easily shared and moved: “Large corporations and government agencies collecting
information for relatively static databases are no longer typical of personal data collectors
and processors” (The White House 2012:9).
Another characteristic of modern technology exhibited in the reports and guidelines
was the “rapid action” that it facilitates and, in turn, necessitates. While the speed of
technology was often presented as an advantage for law enforcement, it also creates
challenges for the legal system, designed to be slow and deliberative, and creates lags that
allow programs like the NSA’s. The Big Data report, for example, discussed how this “rapid
action” helps law enforcement: “[T]he use of advanced surveillance technology by federal,
state, and local law enforcement can mean a faster and more effective response to criminal
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activity” (Executive Office of the President 2014:31). Meanwhile, in “Safeguarding Privacy,”
rapid action was presented as a necessary response to keep pace with the scale and speed
of modern data mining programs: “We believe rapid action is necessary to address the host
of government programs that involve data mining concerning U.S. persons and to provide
clear direction to the people responsible for developing, procuring, implementing, and
overseeing those programs” (Department of Defense (DOD) 2004:12). Later, the report
recommended steps to protect individual privacy in the face of rapidly evolving technology,
and other documents also discussed the need to create alternatives to the legal system to
protect these individual freedoms. The Consumer Privacy guidelines, for instance, spoke of
the necessity of rapid action to keep pace with the speed of technology and maintain
individual privacy protection, advocating “multistakeholder processes” as a more timely
alternative to regulatory processes and treaty-based organizations: “These groups
frequently function on the basis of consensus and are amenable to the participation of
individuals and groups with limited resources. These characteristics lend legitimacy to the
groups and their findings, which in turn can encourage rapid and effective
implementation.” While the legal system has been used to regulate privacy, the
“unprecedented” pace of technological development is presented in these reports and
guidelines as necessitating supplementary and alternative regulations. However, despite
presenting issues created by the pace of technology, the shortcomings and relative
enforceability of the suggested alternatives was not discussed at any length in the
documents, indicating that these alternatives are in the nascent, hypothetical stages.
Still, discussions of the lag between the legal system and rapidly advancing
technology were only one example of the challenges of technology that were discussed in
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the reports and guidelines. The challenges of mass data mining, almost always with regard
to upholding privacy laws and standards, were a frequent topic in both the guidelines and
reports, and the use of the word challenge was consistent across the reports and
guidelines, framing the more negative aspects of data management as something to be
overcome rather than immutable drawbacks. The OECD guidelines described challenges
related to the value of personal data that result from the open and connected environment
that modern technology allows (OECD 2013:12). The Big Data Report also identified new
challenges for data privacy protection that result from advancing technology: “The advent
of more powerful analytics, which can discern quite a bit from even small and disconnected
pieces of data, raises the possibility that data gathered and held by third parties can be
amalgamated and analyzed in ways that reveal even more information about individuals”
(Executive Office of the President 2014:34). The reports and guidelines explained that the
rapid development of technology has made previously effective privacy protections
obsolete. Anonymized data, for example, can now be re-identified with increasing ease.
Additionally, while sensor technologies that are increasingly prevalent in phones, homes,
offices, and public utilities automatically collect information, technologies that promote
transparency and privacy choices are developing more slowly and not being widely utilized
(Executive Office of the President 2014:42, 58). The report discussed other challenges
associated with big data, like uneven regulation and access to data by individuals,
corporations, and the government, and filterable characteristics that create the potential
for discrimination (Executive Office of the President 2014:48). The “challenges” of Big Data
represented in the NSA documents, however, only reflected areas of limited access (NSA
27), and social challenges like discrimination were not discussed at all. Other challenges
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were issued internally to increase technical and technological data mining capabilities
(NSA 32). Solutions for overcoming these challenges were usually based in technological
developments (NSA 30).
Similarly, the NSA documents discussed the benefits of technology in a manner that
was inconsistent with its portrayal in the reports and guidelines. Although in the public
documents the challenges of Big Data were primarily addressed in the Big Data Report, the
OECD Guidelines and the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, the “benefits” of Big Data were
extolled at length in those same documents, and also “Safeguarding Privacy.” One listed
benefit of Big Data was its potential to actually protect privacy; while the Big Data report
presented the re-identification of data as a challenge, it also stated that big data can be used
to “enhance accountability and to engineer systems that are inherently more respectful of
privacy and civil rights” (Executive Office of the President 2014:22). The Big Data report
also presented multiple other social and economic benefits of using data to increase
productivity: “Big data applications create social and economic value on a scale that,
collectively, is of strategic importance for the nation. Technological innovation is the
animating force of the American economy. In the years to come, big data will foster
significant productivity gains in industry and manufacturing, further accelerating the
integration of the industrial and information economies” (Executive Office of the President
2014:48). While the reports and guidelines discussed the social benefits of technology, the
NSA documents treated the benefits of technology the same way they discussed challenges;
while collection limitation was presented as a challenge of technology, collection
facilitation was a benefit, and social repercussions were not discussed.
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There were further disparities in the discussions of technology in the NSA
documents versus those in the reports, laws, and guidelines. The NSA documents were
overwhelmingly technical, and a majority of them referenced technology. As discussed, the
presentation of potential social benefits and challenges of these technologies was entirely
absent, and technological advances were instead only celebrated for their unprecedented
ability to increase access to targets’ data (NSA 10, NSA 29) and their efficiency (NSA 30),
but other aspects of technology were also discussed. For example, the increasing
capabilities of evolving technology were also frequently discussed (NSA 36, NSA 29, NSA
30), as were the perceived threat of foreign nations’ increasing technological capabilities
(NSA 31). In addition, the training-based nature of many of the documents spoke to the
novelty of the access provided by technology, and the escalating ubiquity of data collection
was reflected through slides that demonstrated drastically escalating data collection (NSA
19, NSA 22, NSA, NSA 30, NSA 30, NSA 34, NSA 43). Technological discussions in the NSA
documents also included the vulnerabilities of particular types of technology, websites, and
email providers (NSA 32, NSA, NSA 10, NSA 11, NSA 16A, NSA 16D), further suggesting that
the intent of the program was to maximize the potential of technology, not consider its
social repercussions. As in the reports and guidelines, more rapid action was presented as
one of the benefits of technological advances (NSA 15, NSA 7, NSA 30 2), but, partly owing
to their technical nature, the NSA documents were much less reflexive than the public
documents, and, while they demonstrated the properties of technology that were discussed
in the reports and guidelines, there was no debate about the merits of the conducted
surveillance. Still, the NSA documents corroborate the theme of technology as facilitator,
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providing evidence that the qualities of technology discussed in the reports, laws, and
guidelines facilitated the creation and expansio
expansion
n of the surveillance programs.

Protecting America with Big Data

Fig. 3: The theme of Protecting America with Big Data included references to national security and crime
prevention as well as discussions of the importance of protecting American ideals and freedoms. These
discussions were principally limited to the reports and guidelines. The invocation of terrorists and terrorism
as justifications for data collection was similarly limited, app
appearing 237
37 times in the PATRIOT Act, 26 times in
“Safeguarding Privacy,” and virtually nowhere else in the reports, laws, and guidelines.

The second theme, “Protecting America with Big Data,” encompassed recurring
representations of the national governmen
government as a protector. While technological advances
made the NSA programs technically feasible, the documents demonstrated that a desire for
protection and security was equa
equally responsible for their creation. “Protecting America
with Big Data,” not only spoke tto
o the roles that national security and efforts to thwart
terrorism play in dataveillance, but also the ways in which data collection both protects
and threatens fundamental American rights and freedoms. Data collection was presented
as a way of protecting American citizens across the laws, reports, guidelines, and NSA
N
documents. While “terrorism,” “national security,” and “crime prevention” were inductive
codes, “protecting our way of life” emerged as a deductive code as a result of the emphasis
that the reports
ports and guidelines placed on the importance of protecting American liberties
and freedoms.
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As expected, national security was presented as an important user and driver of
dataveillance in the reports, laws, guidelines, and NSA documents. Both “Safeguarding
Privacy” and the Big Data report addressed this benefit, and the Cybersecurity Legislative
Proposal recommended updating cybersecurity law “to better protect America against
cyber threats (The White House 2011:1). “Safeguarding Privacy”, which was created
specifically to evaluate government data mining programs, dealt almost exclusively with
this benefit to national security (DOD 2004). The PATRIOT Act, meanwhile, specifically
amended surveillance law in order to protect against terrorist threats, and the NSA
documents indicated targeting potential terrorists in order to prevent future attacks. The
invocation of terrorists and terrorism across the documents was itself noteworthy. The
documents that predated the 2001 terrorist attacks were, except where amended, wholly
silent on the subject, but the PATRIOT Act, used the words terrorist and terrorism 237
times, or an average of 1.8 times per page (USAPATRIOT 2001). “Safeguarding Privacy”
repeated the words 26 times over 18 pages, an average of 1.4 times per page (DOD 2004).
By contrast, the Big Data report used the word terrorist only once in 85 pages, and none of
the other reports, laws, or guidelines mentioned either terrorists or terrorism. While
national security continued to be a relevant justification for data collection across the
reports, guidelines, and laws, terrorism itself was used as a justification only in the two
documents that were written closest to the 9/11 attacks, indicating that it lost its salience
as the attacks became less immediate.
However, national security was not the only way government was portrayed as a
protector in the documents. The code “protecting our way of life” was an inductive code,
created for discussions in the reports, laws, and guidelines about protecting privacy rights

33

and constitutional freedoms. The theme of government as protector, both of its citizens and
freedom, appeared across all four document groups, with the reports and guidelines
speaking most frequently of the obligation the government has to “protect its citizens when
exercising power and authority for the public good” (Executive Office of the President
2014:22). In reports that discussed the dangers posed to privacy by Big Data, “protecting
our way of life” asserted the government’s commitment to upholding law and privacy, even
as, “big data could be a tool that substantially expands government power over citizens”
(Executive Office of the President 2014:22). As expressed in the Consumer Privacy Bill of
Rights, this government commitment to “protecting our way of life” extended to the private
sector; the report stated that the “United States has both the responsibility and incentive to
help establish forward-looking privacy policy models that foster innovation and preserve
basic privacy rights” (The White House 2012:7). That paper suggested the access and
accuracy principle to facilitate consumer access to data that is collected about them,
“interpreted with full respect for First Amendment values, especially for non-commercial
speakers and individuals exercising freedom of the press” (The White House 2012:20). In
addition, while “Safeguarding Privacy” dedicated much discussion to terrorist threats and
the pressing need to defend against these threats, it also stated that Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, “charged the committee with developing safeguards to ensure that the
application of this or any like technology developed within the DOD is carried out in
accordance with U.S. law and American values related to privacy” (DOD 2004:1).
“Protecting our way of life,” therefore, emphasized the government’s purported
commitment to protecting its citizens from external, as well as internal threats.
The NSA documents did not display the same commitment to protecting individual
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liberties that was evident in the reports, laws, and guidelines, and only demonstrated an
interest in national security. The NSA documents contained several references to
protecting national security and promoting law enforcement efforts, and some of these
explicitly referred to protecting America’s cyberspace through data mining initiatives (NSA
38 2, 4). Other references were to counterterrorism, preventing and investigating
international crime and narcotics, and other international security issues (NSA 22). Two
documents explicitly referred to threat management as a goal (NSA 10, NSA 30 7), and the
DTI Report in particular contained references to terrorism and preventing terrorist threats
(NSA 30). Targets of surveillance included but were not limited to suspected terrorists;
other targets included foreign governments (NSA 10). Furthermore, while discussions of
national security in the NSA documents omitted discussions of “protecting our way of life,”
national security was not the only justification used for surveillance, and other cases of
surveillance were economically and politically motivated (NSA 24). Although the NSA
documents emphasized national security over the protection of civil liberties, and were in
that sense inconsistent with the laws, reports, and guidelines, they did corroborate the
overall theme of protection being both a justification for and a use of dataveillance.
Furthermore, the overwhelming use of the word terrorist and terrorism as justifications for
changes in surveillance law following the 9/11 attacks indicates a shift in the social climate
and escalation of fears following those attacks, leading to a social environment that was
more supportive of government surveillance programs.
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The Legality of Dataveillance

Fig. 4:: The Legality of Dataveillance. The legal system, slow and deliberate by design, was portrayed in the
reports and guidelines as too slow to keep up with the pace of technological change, creating legal loopholes
that allow mass data collection programs
programs.. The NSA documents demonstrated an interest in legality, adhering
to a legal “line at the border” that treats foreign nationals differently than American citizens. This approach
was codified in the PATRIOT Act but discredited in the reports and guidelines, which advocated extending
privacy protections to everyone.

While the PATRIOT Act used the instability and fear sur
surrounding
rounding the 9/11 terrorist
attacks to justify changing the surveillance requirements for suspected terrorists, the other
documents used in this study discussed additional legal issues, related to technological
advances, that potentially threaten privacy. The “Legality of Dataveillance”” theme included
discussions of the legality and morality of dataveillance; “privacy” and “legal” were
deductive codes, but “line at the border” and “security and privacy” both arose from
discussions in the documents that rela
related
ted to the two deductive codes. The reports and
guidelines both discussed how the advance of technology and the slow pace of the legal
system create loopholes
pholes that take years to close, allowing programs like the NSA’s to
employ collection techniques that h
have
ave been discredited in the reports and guidelines. The
PATRIOT Act actually codified an example of this: a legal line at the border that excludes
foreign nationals from the privacy protection afforded to American citizens (USAPATRIOT
2001:11, 15). Traditionally, information collected outside of the United States is exempt
from the legal requirements of information collected inside the country,, but because of
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technological advances, data no longer stops at political borders, and a substantial amount
of collected information flows through American as well as foreign data networks (NSA 4,
NSA 5, NSA 7). Indeed, the NSA documents present this as a benefit to be used when data
gathering (NSA 4). The major distinction governing surveillance now is not where the
information is collected, but on whom it is collected. Importantly, the reports and
guidelines used in this study discredited this approach, and advocated extending American
privacy protections to all individuals, but the suggestions made in those documents have
not been followed. This raises questions about the best way to protect privacy given
rapidly advancing technological capabilities, a slow legal system, and unenforceable
suggestions made in official reports and guidelines.
Perhaps because of the confusion surrounding the issue, the “Legality of
Dataveillance” theme was the least consistent of the four that emerged from this study.
Within the laws, the PATRIOT Act was discordant with the ECPA and the Privacy Act. Those
earlier documents both extended individual rights to data protection and government
transparency where the PATRIOT Act limited them. Sometimes, as when the Big Data
report called the existing consumer data privacy framework “strong” in its introduction
(The White House 2012:i) but then detailed limitations of the existing legal system in the
body (The White House 2012:6), documents even contradicted themselves.
Of all the document categories, the reports and guidelines presented the most
concerns about individual legal privacy protections. In the reports and guidelines, privacy
was presented as a fundamental and cherished, as well as constitutionally protected,
American right. The reports and guidelines, while stressing the government’s commitment
to maintaining these rights even as Big Data fundamentally changes the way government
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functions, also discussed the importance of creating trust with the American public. The
reports and guidelines enumerated a number of specific threats Big Data presents for
privacy: “Big data analytics have the potential to eclipse longstanding civil rights
protections in how personal information is used in housing, credit, employment, health,
education, and the marketplace” (Executive Office of the President 2014:iiv). The Big Data
report frequently discussed the potential for discrimination; 9 of the 10 coded segments in
this category came from that report. The other came from the OECD guidelines, which
made ensuring there is no discrimination against data subjects one of its provisions under
“National Implementation” (OECD 2013:17). Because digitized data is easily searchable and
filterable—something that makes it particularly useful for marketers as well as
surveillance technicians—it presents the possibility of what the Big Data report called
“digital redlining.” That report listed instances of different prices offered to individuals
based on the area in which they live. In its recommendations, it exhorted companies and
the government to take policy measures necessary to prevent these instances of
discrimination. These privacy issues were presented as an inherent “challenge” resulting
from big data, and the government was presented as both respectful of privacy and
committed to upholding the law.
The legal limitations code was used in the Big Data Report, the OECD guidelines, the
Consumer Privacy, and “Safeguarding Privacy” guidelines. While the laws all dealt with
privacy issues—The ECPA and the Privacy Act were both created to address threats to
privacy arising from new technology and governmental collection and storage of data on
individuals and the PATRIOT Act maintained concern with constitutionally protected rights
of citizens even as it extended governmental data collection powers—the laws themselves
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did not explicitly address the legal limitations that led to their creation. The reports and
guidelines, however, generally presented legal limitations as a significant obstacle to
protecting privacy. Legal privacy protections were called disjointed, out of date, and too
narrowly defined (Executive Office of the President 2014; DOD 2004). “Safeguarding
Privacy” presented an alternate view of legal limitations, discussing them in reference to
the fight against terrorism: “Existing legal requirements applicable to the government’s
many data mining programs are numerous, but disjointed and often outdated, and as a
result may compromise the protection of privacy, public confidence, and the nation’s ability
to craft effective and lawful responses to terrorism” (DOD 2004:5).
The Big Data Report and the Consumer Privacy Guidelines both framed their
discussion of legal limitations with regard to individual privacy protections. The Big Data
Report discussed how privacy law became disjointed and narrowly defined, making it more
difficult to broadly protect individual privacy: “In the United States during the 1970s and
80s, narrowly defined sectoral privacy laws began to supplement the tort-based body of
common law. These sector-specific laws create privacy safeguards that apply only to
specific types of entities and data. With a few exceptions, individual states and the federal
government have predominantly enacted privacy laws on a sectoral basis” (Executive
Office of the President 2014:18). In addition, The Consumer Privacy bill also cited the legal
limitations of Internet consumer privacy protection, including the lack of comprehensive
policy:
“Much of the personal data used on the Internet, however, is not
subject to comprehensive Federal statutory protection, because most Federal
data privacy statutes apply only to specific sectors, such as healthcare,
education, communications, and financial services or, in the case of online
data collection, to children” (The White House 2012:6).
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In the foreword to The Consumer Privacy bill, the authors contradicted this statement,
saying, “The consumer data privacy framework in the United States is, in fact, strong. This
framework rests on fundamental privacy values, flexible and adaptable common law
protections and consumer protection statutes, Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
enforcement, and policy development that involves a broad array of stakeholders”(The
White House 2012:i) While the authors tempered this optimistic statement somewhat, the
endorsement of existing consumer data privacy protection contradicted statements
contained within those guidelines and the other documents used in this study.
The Big Data report in particular established the history of privacy law in the United
States. Fair information practice principles, or FIPPs, were created in 1973 and established
in the 1974 Privacy Act and today, “form the bedrock of modern data protection regimes.”
(Executive Office of the President 2014:17) “The FIPPs articulate basic protections for
handling personal data. They provide that an individual has a right to know what data are
collected about him or her and how it is used. The individual should further have a right to
object to some uses and to correct inaccurate information. The organization that collects
information has an obligation to ensure that the data are reliable and kept secure.”
(Executive Office of the President 2014:17) Still, as with the rest of the existing legal
privacy protections, the NSA documents demonstrate practical concerns with existing legal
privacy protections.
While the NSA documents did demonstrate an interest in legality, they also showed
some current limitations of legal oversight. They also show that data are collected on U.S.
citizens as well as foreign nationals, referring to efforts to minimize, or remove personally
identifiable information from, data collected on U.S. citizens (NSA 27; 37). The Big Data
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ineffective
ve for protecting private data, and
Report argued that minimization is increasingly ineffecti
the use of the technique shows that surveillance programs collectt information on U.S.
citizens as well
ll as foreign nationals. The theme “legality of dataveillance” therefore
demonstrated inconsistencies between public statements and private practices, and
illuminated the limitations of current privacy protections.

Protecting
ecting Privacy: Accountability, Transparency, and Oversight

Fig. 5:: Protecting Privacy in the Face of Legal, Social, and Technological Change. The reports and guidelines
both discussed measures to protect privacy, but these measures were not consistent with those
demonstrated in the NSA documents. While the reports and guidelines both stressed the importance of
transparency and external oversight for maintaining a robust democracy, the NSA documents only
demonstrated internal oversight. Additionally, while co
co-operation
operation and standardization was presented in the
reports and guidelines as a way for protecting data, in the NSA documents, co
co-operation
operation and standardization
were used to share data collected under FISA court warrants wi
with
th multiple law enforcement agencies, that
are not supposed to operate under the FISA court.

Because of the legal system
system’s privacy protection limitations,, several documents
suggested or,, in the case of the laws, codified privacy protections. The final theme,
“Protecting Privacy” encompassed these discussions and revealed incompatibilities
between the suggestions made in the reports and guidelines and standard NSA practices.
The reports and guidelines were still the consistent categories, calling for accountability
acc
facilitated by transparency and oversight as a way to protect privacy. The Big Data report
also discussed the need for more extensive user controls that would allow users to
t control
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how much information was collected about them (Executive Office of the President
2014:62). The Consumer Privacy and OECD guidelines similarly advocated for use and
collection limitations that would restrict the amount of data that are collected and also the
ways companies use those data (OECD 2013:14; The White House 2012:1, 6, 15, 16, 21).
User control and collection limitation help individuals manage the data that is collected
about them on the front end, while use limitations protect their data once it has already
been collected. Accountability, transparency, and oversight theoretically apply to all stages
of the process, but the NSA documents indicate differing standards of accountability and
transparency than were evident in the reports and guidelines.
The accountability code appeared in the guidelines, the PATRIOT Act, and the Privacy
Act. In his introduction to the Privacy Act, President Obama stated that, “A democracy
requires accountability, and accountability requires transparency” (Privacy Act 1974:44).
That act also affirmed the need to have transparency in order to have government
accountability, establishing the right of citizens to their own information or information
about their government. The PATRIOT Act, however, removed accountability for people
who “in good faith produce tangible things under and order pursuant to section [215…]
Such production shall not be deemed to constitute a waiver of any privilege in any other
proceeding or context” (USAPATRIOT 2001:17). Not only are people not required to
divulge their involvement and disclosure of information pursuant to a FISA warrant, they
are also outright prohibited from discussing those warrants with anyone, including legal
counsel. That inhibits the possibility for journalists and advocates to investigate or
question the program, thereby allowing the programs to operate in secret without external
review. The PATRIOT Act did establish some accountability for law enforcement
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implementing an ex parte order, requiring records of all installed surveillance devices that
identify the officers that installed and/or accessed the device, the dates and times of
installation, uninstallation, and access, the configuration of the device, and information
collected by the device (USAPATRIOT 2001:17), but overall it still limited government
accountability where earlier laws enhanced it.
The guidelines discussed accountability differently than the laws. The Consumer
Privacy discussed the need for FTC enforcement that holds companies accountable for
protecting sensitive personal information (The White House 2012:2, 29). However, those
guidelines also stated that companies and consumers share responsibility for protecting
their information. While “Consumers have a right to have personal data handled by
companies with appropriate measures in place to assure they adhere to the Consumer
Privacy Bill of Rights” (The White House 2012:1), consumers also have a responsibility
when choosing privacy settings and sharing personal data (The White House 2012:13). The
OECD guidelines, however, stressed that data controllers alone are accountable for
personal data under their control and never mentioned the responsibility consumers or
individuals bear for managing their own data (OECD 2013:16).
While accountability was portrayed as an important way to protect privacy,
“transparency,” according to the documents that discussed it, is the principle way of
ensuring accountability. The Big Data report and Consumer Privacy guidelines generally
applauded the way the U.S. government deals with privacy issues, giving the Obama
administration in particular credit for transparency (Executive Office of the President
2014:9). The Big Data Report, which presented transparency as essential for democracy,
gave multiple examples of the government’s commitment to transparency, including its
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establishment of data.gov, a central site for all publicly accessible government data. While it
is the only document in this study published following the Snowden revelations, there was
no discussion of the ramifications of top-secret, ongoing surveillance programs for
transparency.
The OECD Guidelines and Consumer Privacy guidelines also both emphasized the
need for transparency when using data. The four coded segments from the OECD guidelines
all spoke of member countries’ obligation to uphold principles of transparency. The
openness principle (OECD 2013:15) in that set of guidelines was similar to the Fair
Information Practices enumerated in the Privacy Act. That document established principles
of access to personal information held by the government: “Each agency that maintains a
system of records shall—(1) upon request by any individual to gain access to his record or
to any information pertaining to him which is contained in the system, permit him and
upon his request, a person of his own choosing to accompany him, to review the record and
have a copy made of all or any portion thereof in a form comprehensible to him” (Privacy
Act 1974:47).
In his note at the beginning of the privacy act, President Obama asserted his
commitment to transparency, and upholding the Privacy Act in order to perpetuate the
vital role it plays in democracy (Privacy Act 1974:44). He exhorted government agencies
and employees to respect the Freedom of Information Act:
The Freedom of Information Act should be administered with a clear
presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails. The Government
should not keep information confidential merely because public officials
might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be
revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears. Nondisclosure should
never be based on an effort to protect the personal interests of Government
officials at the expense of those they are supposed to serve. In responding to
requests under the FOIA, executive branch agencies should act promptly and
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in a spirit of cooperation, recognizing that such agencies are servants of the
public (Privacy Act 1974:44).

The 13 segments from the Consumer Privacy report that were coded for “protecting
privacy” spoke of consumer rights to easily accessible and understandable information
about how their personal data is collected and used, as well as the ability to correct
inaccurate data (The White House 2013:13, 48). One segment discussed the need for more
transparency in credit markets (The White House 2012:47). Two codes discussed the
Obama administration’s commitment to government transparency (The White House
2012:2, 20). Like “transparency,” “oversight” was portrayed in the documents as a way of
ensuring accountability. This code appeared most often in the reports and guidelines, but
the laws discussed oversight, as well. Section 502 of the PATRIOT Act stated, “On a
semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate concerning all requests for the production of tangible things under section 402”
(USAPATRIOT 2001:17). “Safeguarding Privacy” also gave the responsibility for oversight
of data mining programs to Congress: “There is also a critical need for Congress to exercise
appropriate oversight, especially given the fact that many data mining programs may
involve classified information which would prevent immediate public disclosure” (DOD
2004:10). The report also recommended managerial and judicial oversight, including a 5part checklist for ensuring oversight of data mining and recommending that the Secretary
create “meaningful” oversight mechanisms (DOD 2004:5, 8).
The OECD guidelines discussed the need for oversight 8 times, and the Consumer
Privacy guidelines implicitly referred to the need for oversight when discussing
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accountability and enforcement, in statements that call for FTC enforcement, and
government accountability. The Big Data report referred to a lack of oversight for
government employees who deal with data: “In the past, users and system administrators
might have been issued a login and username and granted total access, sometimes without
an audit trail monitoring their use” (Executive Office of the President 2014:28). Later, that
same report stressed the need for various arenas of government to experiment with the
potential of Big Data, but only while being subjected to appropriate accountability and
oversight measures (Executive Office of the President 2014:66). The cybersecurity
legislative proposal also recommended oversight that includes congressional reporting
(DOD 2004:2, 4).
The NSA documents discussed privacy in the context of steps taken to protect and
properly handle sensitive data (NSA 30 12). The DTI report, for example, referenced the
creation of 430,000 terrorism-related records, and deletion of “50,000 subjects whose
nexus to terrorism was refuted, or did not meet current watchlisting criteria” (NSA 30 2).
Another presentation stated that each agency will “minimize the acquisition and retention,
and prohibit the dissemination, of non-publicly available information concerning
unconsenting U.S. persons consistent with the need of the U.S. to obtain, produce, and
disseminate foreign intelligence information” (NSA 43). Not only are data on U.S. citizens
clearly being acquired, there is no cross-agency standardized protocol for disposing of such
information. The AuroraGold project apparently includes “auto-minimization” (NSA 27 2).
No segments of the NSA documents met the criteria for the “accountability” code, but
there were several references to oversight. In the documents, this oversight was entirely
internal, team-based or FISA court-based (NSA 2C, NSA 21). Sometimes, specific analysts or
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people with specific levels of clearance were the only people allowed to conduct certain
surveillance, but it was unclear who except their superiors within the agency has oversight
over these individuals (NSA 14, NSA 15). Reference was made to NSA standards (NSA 27 2)
and observance of rules and indications of authorities requesting investigations (NSA 39
49). User monitoring, or internal audits of IC-wide users were conducted by the NSA “to
guarantee correct investigations and the observance of rules and indications” (NSA 39).
The respective agencies would be notified of non-compliance, and persons found to be
conducting inappropriate surveillance would be removed (NSA 43), but there was no
reference to external or Congressional oversight. There was also minimal evidence of
collection limitation in the NSA documents, aside from references to minimization of data
collected on U.S. citizens. Most of the documents referencing collection celebrated
escalating collection capabilities and quantities of information (NSA 30 5, 6, 8, 10, 12; NSA
32 2; NSA 34 11; NSA 43; NSA 43 16, 20, 30; NSA 44 1).
In addition to accountability, transparency, and oversight, the reports and guidelines
also presented cooperation and standardization as a method of protecting privacy. The
code “standardization and cooperation” was used across all four document categories, but
had an entirely different meaning in the NSA documents than in the reports, guidelines and,
to a lesser extent, the laws. The reports and guidelines presented standardization and
cooperation as a necessary measure that, like transparency, accountability, and oversight,
is necessary to protect individual data. For example, The Big Data report explicitly dealt
with a lack of cooperation and inter-departmental standardization that poses challenges
for data and privacy protection: “Many of the databases DHS operates today are physically
disconnected, run legacy operating systems, and are unable to integrate information across
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different security classifications. The Department also carries out a diverse portfolio of
missions, each governed by separate authorities in law...Ensuring information is properly
used falls to six offices at DHS headquarters” (Executive Office of the President 2014:27).
Likewise, “Safeguarding Privacy”, the Privacy Protection Study Commission Report, the Big
Data Report, the OECD guidelines, and the Consumer Privacy guidelines all recommended
improving standardization and cooperation with respect to data privacy protections (DOD
2004:9, 10; The White House 2011:1; Executive Office of the President 2014:37, 48; OECD
11, 16, 17; The White House 2012:2, 7). Inter and intra-governmental cooperation was one
recurring theme. “Safeguarding Privacy” stated that, “government efforts to protect
national security and fight crime and to protect privacy will be enhanced by the articulation
of government-wide principles and a consistent system of laws and processes” (DOD
2004:10). The Big Data report likewise suggested adopting its recommendations “across all
agencies and security levels” (Executive Office of the President 2014:37). That report also
encouraged cooperation between public and private sectors (Executive Office of the
President 2014:48), as do the OECD guidelines, which also advocated inter-government
cooperation: “The continuous flows of personal data across global networks amplify the
need for improved interoperability among privacy frameworks as well as strengthened
cross-border cooperation among privacy enforcement authorities” (OECD 2013:11). The
Consumer Privacy guidelines likewise encouraged global cooperation, specifically
international operability of data privacy frameworks through mutual recognition and
enforcement cooperation. (The White House 2012:2, 7).
The PATRIOT Act also explicitly encouraged cooperation, although its intent was less
clear in that document. The results of the PATRIOT Act’s references to cooperation are
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demonstrated in the NSA documents. Orders issued under Section 216 automatically
applied “to any person or entity providing wire or electronic communication service in the
United States whose assistance may facilitate the execution of the order” (PATRIOT 18).
Under Section 414, the Act mandates that visa entry and exit data systems interface with
law enforcement databases (USAPATRIOT 2001:83). The NSA documents demonstrated
this cooperation with other government agencies, including the CIA, FBI, TSC, TSA, NGA,
DoS, DHS, CPB, DIA, DEA, US Army Special Forces, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security,
INTERPOL, and GCHQ (NSA 30 9, NSA 34 6, NSA 37 1). There were references to
information sharing with the CIA and FBI, and to training agents from the other
departments (NSA 30 8). The Directorate of Terrorist Identities (DTI) partnered with the
CIA to use information obtained on foreign governments through that agency’s HYDRA
program, which clandestinely accessed foreign government’s databases and mined the data
found there. (NSA 30 9). In the instance discussed, DTI provided the names of 555 Pakistani
subjects. The HYDRA program in turn vetted these names against Pakistani passports,
enhancing the information on all 555 of those subjects (NSA 30 9).
The NSA documents demonstrate cooperation in other ways. While in most cases, the
cooperation can be seen as resulting directly from the PATRIOT Act, this cooperation did
not function as a privacy protection. Cooperation with private businesses demonstrated in
the NSA documents included the NSA’s use of data collected by gmail, facebook, Hotmail,
Yahoo, Apple, Google, Skype, paltalk.com, YouTube and AolMail from their customers under
their terms of use. Rather than serving to protect individual or consumer privacy, as the
reports and guidelines indicated, the NSA’s cooperation with private corporations actually
violated these individual privacies. As dictated by section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, the
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corporations turned over the information but did not disclose to anyone, including the
surveillance subjects, that they had done so. One slide referenced the two types of
collection the program uses: upstream, which collects communications on “fiber cables and
infrastructure as data flows past” (NSA 3). The other collection took data directly from the
servers of the aforementioned companies, calling into question how voluntary corporate
cooperation with the NSA actually is.
Indeed, the NSA’s cooperation appears to be limited and coercive. Aside from working
with the four other countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK) in the Five Eyes,
there was no evidence in the NSA documents of cooperation with other countries. Rather,
the governments of literally every other country not in the Five Eyes were authorized as
surveillance targets, along with “Entities openly acknowledged by a Foreign Government or
Governments to be Directed and Controlled by Such Foreign Government or Governments”
(NSA 1). This list included the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, the
African Union, and OPEC (NSA 1). The secretive nature of warrants provides no recourse
for appeal and, as a whole, the NSA programs make a mockery of the standardization and
cooperation exalted in the reports and guidelines as a valuable method for protecting
privacy.
The themes that emerged throughout the analysis of the data in this study, when
compared together, paint a picture of post-9/11 dataveillance. Technological innovations
made this type of surveillance possible, but the social insecurity and desire for protection
in an uncertain world that followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks allowed a fundamental
change in the existing legal framework. The PATRIOT Act, which codified those changes,
was inconsistent with the previous laws analyzed in this study because it limited civil
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liberties and extended governmental surveillance powers where the earlier laws extended
privacy protections and standards of government transparency and accountability.
Additionally, the PATRIOT Act relied heavily on the invocation of terrorist threats to justify
the changes it made; the earlier laws never reference these threats at all.
The reports and guidelines were most thematically similar of all the document
groups, consistently portraying technology as a facilitator of data mining programs. The
social risks and benefits of these technologies were thoughtfully considered in both the
reports and guidelines; neither the laws nor the NSA documents considered these potential
ramifications. Privacy was also presented as a fundamental and constitutionally protected
American right in the reports and guidelines. While the laws did not discuss privacy in the
same way as the reports and guidelines, the ECPA and the Privacy Act both extended
individual privacy protections, and therefore were thematically similar to the reports and
guidelines in that respect. The PATRIOT Act continued to be distinct from the other laws,
but it too contained provisions designed to protect privacy. Meanwhile, the NSA documents
were again inconsistent, adhering to legal standards but employing methods of privacy
protection that the reports and guidelines discredited. The NSA documents also contained
no references to the ideological importance of protecting privacy. Furthermore, while the
reports and guidelines presented external oversight and transparency as essential for
democratic government, and standardization and cooperation as a valuable tool for
protecting data, the NSA documents demonstrated only internal oversight, no
transparency, and used “cooperation” to access increasing amounts of personal data.
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Discussion
Hypothesis 1: The NSA documents will display different themes than the reports,
laws, and guidelines.
Finding: The NSA documents displayed similar themes as the other document
categories, but their meaning often contradicted their usage in the reports, laws and
guidelines. The risk society model predicts that attempts to predict risk in contemporary
society results in contradictions, but the control society model would portray this
contradiction as a deliberate attempt to mislead the public.
Hypothesis 2: The reports and guidelines will be thematically consistent.
Finding: Of all the document categories, the reports and guidelines were the most
thematically consistent.
Hypothesis 3: The laws will be thematically consistent with the reports and
guidelines.
Finding: The laws were not thematically consistent with each other, and the
PATRIOT Act curtailed civil liberties where the ECPA and the Privacy Act protected them.
The laws were more similar to the reports and guidelines than the NSA documents, but
were a distinctive category.
Hypothesis 4: The control society theoretical model predicts that data collection
will be haphazard, corporations and competition will play a prominent role in surveillance,
codes will be used to de-individuate targets of surveillance, and the intent of surveillance is
to control populations.
The risk society theoretical model predicts that data collection will be actuarial and
precise, based on risk models and focused on risk prevention.
The risk society theoretical model is the best theoretical explanation of post-9/11
surveillance, as represented by the NSA’s surveillance program.
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Finding: The NSA surveillance programs collected data haphazardly and
corporations played a prominent role in surveillance. Codes were used to de-individuate
targets of surveillance, but the question of intent is subjective. Given the scope of the
surveillance programs’ data collection, the collected information cannot currently be
analyzed effectively. Contradictions are inherent in the program, and its existence is
justified by the presence of terrorist threat. Both the risk society and control society
models are applicable to the NSA’s surveillance programs.
The results illuminate a discrepancy between public and private governmental
representations of privacy and transparency that is best explained by the risk management
theoretical model. Although the public documents were fairly consistent across the laws,
reports, and guidelines, with the guidelines and reports almost thematically
indistinguishable, the NSA documents employed different language and thematic
representations. For example, standardization and cooperation was presented in the
reports and guidelines as a tool for enhancing privacy protections, but in the NSA
documents was a way of collecting even more data, often without the consent of the
“cooperating” parties. Similarly, collection limitation was presented in the reports and
guidelines as a way of limiting outside intrusion into consumers’ records, but in the NSA
documents was portrayed as a limitation to be overcome. NSA’s surveillance programs are
justified by previous threats but focused on the prevention of further crimes. Furthermore,
the volume of information indicates a lack of both control and oversight in the face of
unknowable dangers. The risk management theoretical model therefore best explained the
thematic differences in the public documents versus the NSA documents, but the control
society model also appeared to have some applicability.
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While similar themes were present across all of the document groups, the portrayal
of these themes was most consistent across the reports and guidelines. Themes in the
reports and guidelines also tended to be consistent with those in the laws, which formed a
more distinct category because of their formal, legal construction. However, the majority of
themes in the NSA documents were inconsistent with the other document categories. This
was only partially explained by their technical nature, and indicated deliberate framing in
the public documents to convey a message more harmonious with American ideals of
privacy and freedom. One reason the NSA documents were so distinct is that they, like the
laws, were written differently from the reports and guidelines. They were by far the most
technical documents; the NSA is fundamentally a bureaucratic organization, and the
majority of the NSA documents were intended for technicians, to serve as progress reports
and provide training. Unlike the public documents, the NSA documents were also obviously
not intended for an external audience. Thoughtful treatment of American ideals had no
place in the NSA documents; the intended audience was presumably already convinced of
the merits of the program. Still, practical explanations for the dissimilarity of the NSA
documents to the rest of the documents used in this study did not fully justify the
discrepancies. These discrepancies, particularly those regarding privacy protection and the
importance of oversight and accountability, appear to confirm the direst predictions about
the PATRIOT Act. While the most controversial sections have not been allowed to expire,
they have also not been amended to provide additional oversight or accountability, and the
NSA remains a wing of government almost wholly free from external review. Without the
Snowden leaks, the program would still be entirely hidden from the public; NSA and other
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programs like it are apparently exempt from the requirements of accountability and
transparency that the reports, guidelines, and laws all portray as essential for democracy.
Indeed, there were major discrepancies in the portrayal of accountability and
transparency between the public and NSA documents. The reports and guidelines referred
to the important roles that accountability and transparency play in protecting freedoms,
and stated that neither the government nor the private sector should be exempt from these
requirements. Moreover, the reports and guidelines written for the Obama administration
professed a particular commitment to the principles of accountability of transparency and
discussed a number of steps the administration has taken to ensure transparency. In
addition, the Consumer Data Privacy Report also discussed how technology allows the
government to more easily hold businesses accountable for upholding standards of data
privacy protections. The laws, meanwhile, codified the privacy protections discussed in the
reports and guidelines. The Freedom of Information Act, for example, set standards for
governmental transparency and enabled citizens to access information collected about
them. However, the PATRIOT Act was dissimilar from the other laws in this study because,
while they all dealt with surveillance, the ECPA and the Privacy Act both elevated the
importance of individual privacy protections while the PATRIOT Act limited privacy
protections and expanded government surveillance, using the threat of terrorism as a
justification. The laws used in this study were all created in response to specific events that
demonstrated shortcomings in the existing legal frameworks. However, while the ECPA
and Privacy Act were a response to public pressure for increased privacy protections, the
PATRIOT Act was passed in a climate of instability and fear that followed the 9/11 attacks.
That it expanded government surveillance powers where the earlier laws limited them
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lends support to the Risk Society model, but also could be construed as supporting the
control and surveillant assemblage explanations of the advance of government power and
erosion of democratic safeguards and process.
Where the Freedom of Information Act increased individual access to information
that the government collects on them, the PATRIOT Act instead dictated that information
collected on foreign nationals and suspected terrorists, or even information collected
incidental to the pursuit of foreign nationals or suspected terrorists, is explicitly not subject
to the protections given by the Freedom of Information Act. Furthermore, although the
PATRIOT Act did include accountability and privacy protections, explicitly banning
searches based solely on constitutionally protected rights and requiring law enforcement
officers and agencies to track their investigations and report to Congress semi-annually,
these are limited protections. James Clapper, the head of the NSA, lied to Congress in 2013
about the collection of bulk data, a fact that only came to light because of the Snowden
leaks. This raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the accountability provisions
contained within the PATRIOT Act. Because only a small number of people are actually
privy to the exact nature of governmental bulk data collection initiatives, standards of
accountability and transparency are nearly impossible to enforce. Without evidence, lies
are indistinguishable from facts and, in order to protect the ideals of privacy and
transparency present in the reports and guidelines, provisions should be made to enhance
accountability.
Currently, the FISA Court, established to support the legality of covert data mining
programs, is the only means of external oversight for the NSA program, and its work ends
when it either grants or denies permission for searches. Since its creation, it has only
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denied eleven of more than 33,900 (.03%) requests for surveillance (Eichelberger 2013)
and the NSA documents raise serious questions about the extent of the government’s
commitment to transparency, as well as the limitations of accountability in top-secret data
mining initiatives. The NSA operates like a fourth branch of government, wholly opaque
and subject to none of the checks and balances enshrined in the Constitution to protect the
people from governmental overreach.
The documents’ discussion of terrorism raised further questions about motives.
Although in the public documents terrorism was really only discussed in the PATRIOT Act
and “Safeguarding Privacy”, those two documents discussed it at such length, that it
appeared to be a justification for unprecedented governmental surveillance. In the
documents that discussed it, terrorist threats were presented as unprecedented: “This new
threat is unlike anything the nation has faced before” (DOD 2004:1). This appeared to be
deliberate framing and functioned as a powerful justification: since both modern
technology and the threat the U.S. faces from terrorism are unprecedented, unprecedented
uses of terrorism are justified. One explanation for this discrepancy is the timing of the
documents: The PATRIOT Act was passed slightly over a month after the 9/11 attacks, and
“Safeguarding Privacy” was written in 2004, when the attacks were still relatively fresh,
thereby making terrorism a more evocative justification for amending freedoms and
implementing dataveillance than at other points in time. Additionally, the change of
Presidential administrations between those and later documents might also account for a
change in focus.
Moreover, risk prevention was a consistent theme across all four document
categories. Discussions of technology were likewise prominently featured in all four
document categories and often interwoven with discussions of risk prevention, but these
discussions were not consistent between the public and NSA documents. As usual, the
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reports and guidelines were consistent with each other, addressing similar aspects of
technology and extolling the benefits of both technology and the data mining it facilitates.
The reports and guidelines also acknowledged some of the controversy about privacy
rights generated by governmental and corporate uses of technology and paid particular
attention to the use of big data to stimulate economic productivity and growth. Meanwhile,
the NSA documents’ discussion of the benefits and problems with technology centered not
on ethical dilemmas, but rather ways of overcoming technological limitations that limit
data collection. For example, while use/collection limitation is portrayed in the reports and
guidelines as a method of protecting individual data privacy, in the NSA documents, the
code was used in documents that described collection limitations as an obstacle to be
overcome. The connotation of collection limitation in the NSA documents, therefore, was
entirely negative, while in the reports and guidelines it was positive. Indeed, in the NSA
documents all limitations on data collection were considered negative; the intent of the
program, as described in the PowerPoints by its technicians, was to collect and store everincreasing amounts of data. Every technological advance that facilitated this was
celebrated.
While the justifications for collection and also the uses of the data by NSA adhered
more strictly to the risk society model, the emphasis on collecting massive amounts of data
adhered more closely to the control society theoretical model. Rather than the actuarial
precision predicted by the risk society model, the NSA programs actually appeared to
demonstrate the haphazard data collection predicted by the control society model. Both the
risk society and control society models were suggested by the NSA’s analysis of its
abundance of data with sophisticated tools and models, but their ultimate emphasis on
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predicting and averting disaster through their unbridled data collection still indicates the
risk society model.
The risk society model was further suggested by the emphasis on crime prevention
present in the reports, guidelines, laws and NSA documents. As represented in the reports
and guidelines, the intent of surveillance was not to discipline or control the American
population but rather prevent future undesirable events. Additionally, targets of
surveillance in the NSA documents were foreign nationals and suspected terrorists, but the
sheer volume of collected data implied that true control remains elusive, another important
component of the risk society model. Control is elusive precisely because of the lack of
oversight. While before, because of the relative difficulty of obtaining permission for them,
searches used to be necessarily targeted, the staggering amount of information collected by
the NSA program actually obscures useful data.
The “cooperation and standardization” code was another demonstration of the
thematic differences between the NSA documents and the public documents, but was more
suggestive of the flows of information facilitated by technology than any specific theoretical
surveillance model. A broad code, present across all four document categories,
“cooperation and standardization” was applicable to many different aspects of big data
collection and use. For example, the reports and guidelines suggested cooperation as a way
to increase the potential of big data, and cooperation and standardization between
government and private sector systems was encouraged, as was intra-governmental and
industry-wide standardization. In the reports and guidelines, cooperation and
standardization was further presented as having the potential to maximize economic
potential, enhance privacy protection, and increase national security. However, its
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representation in the NSA documents suggested both that this cooperation is not always
voluntary, as in the case of the NSA directly tapping into company servers without the
company’s consent, and potentially detrimental to civil liberties, as when intelligence
agencies share information obtained under FISA with law enforcement officials, thereby
circumventing Title III.
The NSA documents demonstrated interest in legality further implied the risk
society model. While, unlike in the reports and guidelines, there were no lengthy
discussions of the trade-offs between benefits and drawbacks of technology, and there
were only tangential references to privacy protection, such as discussions of “minimizing”
data collected on American citizens, there were several references to following rules, laws
and protocols. The NSA program did not appear to be run by a group of reckless
lawbreakers, but debates about the morality of the program were wholly absent. Again, the
documents were technical in nature and so discussions like those found in the reports and
guidelines would be out of place. The interest in legality underscored the bureaucratic
nature of the organization; these were not the people charged with writing the laws but
rather the technicians who implemented the programs created by changes in laws. Still, the
demonstrated interest in legality again suggested that, rather than a semi-nefarious
attempt to control unruly populations, the NSA program is rather an example of a
sprawling, disjointed government trying to prevent future risks.
However, while the NSA documents included in this study indicate an interest in
legality and use internal audits and enforcements to ensure compliance, the lack of external
oversights individuate the program from the ideals presented in the reports and guidelines,
and the lack of transparency and accountability itself constitutes a threat. While the
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government extolled its attempts to regulate commercial collection and use of data in its
official reports, the NSA documents demonstrated that governmental collection and use of
data is similarly unregulated, and the government uses data collected in the private sector
for purposes not intended at the time of its collection, making the government a
questionable regulator.
There were several other instances of framing throughout the data collected.
Privacy was consistently portrayed as a fundamental American right and value across the
reports, guidelines, and laws. Both the reports and guidelines made the case for extending
American ideals of privacy to non-citizens, and Presidential administrations were
portrayed as committed to upholding the privacy principle and all other constitutionally
protected freedoms. It would be an admittedly hard sell to do otherwise, and stating in a
public document that privacy is important and non-citizens deserve the same protections
as citizens is not the same as codifying these protections through the legal system. In this
case, what appeared more important was what was not said: while the reports and
guidelines lauded steps taken to protect privacy, they omitted discussions of the steps
taken to infringe upon existing privacy protections. Threats to privacy resulting from
governmental uses of technology were likewise minimized. While threats were discussed,
they were portrayed as resulting primarily from external parties. The American
government was portrayed as committed to transparency and accountability and also as a
protector of constitutional rights and freedoms. Top-secret surveillance programs were
understandably not discussed, but leaks of previously confidential information were
likewise ignored. The only report written after the Snowden leaks, The Big Data Report,
was commissioned by President Obama in response to outcry resulting from the leaks but
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mentioned them only once. Calling them an example of “insider threat,” the report lumped
in Snowden with military personnel who attacked their own bases, entirely sidestepping
the issue of his motivations, or the general reaction of the American public at discovering
their government had been covertly collecting massive amounts of data from major
Internet companies for years. The vague discussion of potential threats to privacy resulting
from technology and big data in that report therefore seemed to be a way of appearing to
address issues while sidestepping controversy. While the use of framing was not
necessarily indicative of any theoretical model, it did suggest an attempt at controlling the
perceptions and beliefs of the public and therefore appears to be more suggestive of the
control society model than the risk society model.
The NSA programs’ wide range of targets and demonstrably varied reasons for
targeting individuals, corporations, and foreign nations for surveillance further indicated
limitations to the applicability of the risk management model. The economic motivations
and struggle for dominance in the world economy demonstrated in the NSA documents
were more consistent with the Control Society model than the risk society model. Echoes of
attempts at control were also demonstrated in the PATRIOT Act, particularly in Section
1016, which discussed cyber and physical infrastructure maintenance necessary for,
among other things, economic prosperity. It did not refer to the necessity of covert
surveillance programs or corporate complicity to achieve these economic advantages but
its emphasis on economic superiority, which was also present in the reports and guidelines,
suggested less than wholly altruistic or fear-based motives for surveillance. Both the
control society and risk society models apply to the findings of this study; neither was
demonstrably incorrect. While the current state of surveillance resembles a risk society,
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this study does not preclude the future possibility of a society that more closely resembles
control society if the NSA programs continue as they are. Paradoxically, revelations about
the NSA’s programs, by furthering individual perceptions of surveillance, may even speed
this process causing individuals to modify their behavior, just like the prisoners did in
Foucault’s Panopticon.

Conclusion
Contemporary surveillance is not only ubiquitous in contemporary society but is
also increasingly palatable to the general public. While the government justifies its data
collection by the presentation of threats, the public is already accustomed to willingly
surrendering its information to online businesses in exchange for perceived rewards,
something that the risk society model does not wholly predict. Meanwhile, while the
heterogeneity of contemporary society suggests the futility of any kind of control model,
incarceration rates in this country indicate that the government has not abandoned its
attempts at control. However, the risk society model appeared to be the most appropriate
theoretical model to explain the results of this qualitative analysis of the NSA’s surveillance
program. While the inconsistencies between the public and private documents suggested
deliberate attempts to frame, or control, the message received by the American public,
indicating that aspects of the control society model are also present in post-9/11
surveillance society, the unwieldy size of the programs, the implied and discussed threats
present throughout the document categories, and the emphasis on preventing future
undesirable events most strongly suggested the risk society model. As indicated by the
literature, technology plays a large role in facilitating surveillance programs. However,
without the precise convergence of a catastrophic terrorist attack and the subsequent
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change in law, contemporary surveillance would not be possible (or, at least, legal). After
9/11, a daily barrage of threats are presented to the American public—whether it be ISIS,
or Al Qaeda, or nuclear weapons in Iran, or cyber attacks by China—and provide continuing
justification for the existence of programs like the NSA’s. What used to be unthinkable has
become routine and contemporary society is shaped by the ongoing, unending struggle to
avert undesirable and unpredictable future events.
Contemporary surveillance is complex in every way, its existence possible because of
interconnected networks and unprecedented technology, but equally facilitated by social
and legal changes. This study demonstrated the limitations of the existing legal system to
protect privacy given the continuously and rapidly evolving nature of technology and the
will to collect ever more data on more and more citizens, both foreign and domestic. The
protections suggested in the reports and guidelines were practically unenforced, and the
NSA was shown to operate as a wholly opaque branch of the government. The NSA’s
surveillance programs were consistent with each of the theoretical models studied, lending
credence to both. Still, the program substantively cannot enact the type of control
consistent with either the control society or disciplinary model, and so the risk society was
shown to be the most appropriate model to explain contemporary 9/11 surveillance. As
technology progresses, however, so too will surveillance, creating the possibility that a
control society will eclipse risk society. The most effective way of combatting this
eventuality is the legal system; changes made or suggested outside this system lack the
enforceability necessary for implementation. Further empirical studies of contemporary
surveillance are also necessary to provide more data about the characteristics of specific
surveillance programs and the demonstrable effects of this surveillance.
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Appendix: NSA documents*
NSA 1: In the Matter of Foreign Governments, Foreign Factions, Foreign Entities, and ForeignBased Political Organizations DNI/AG 702(g) Certification 2010-A. Contains a list of foreign
governments “not recognized by the United States,” factions of foreign nations substantially
not composed of U.S. persons, entities openly acknowledged by foreign governments,
foreign-based political organizations, and entities controlled by foreign governments that
are subject to U.S. dataveillance.
NSA 2A, NSA 2B, NSA 2C: A list of frequently asked questions about Boundless Informant,
this document has been declassified and explains what the program does.
NSA 3A, NSA 3B, NSA 3C, NSA 3D: A PowerPoint for Global Access Operations explaining
how Boundless Informant differs from previous programs, details about the program, and
technical tips for executing the program.
NSA 4: This graphic shows the amount of data collected each day for the last 30 days, the
largest volume of records collected (6,142,932,557 records), and the top 5 techs.
NSA 5: This document contains a map showing where data collection is available across the
globe.
NSA 6: Dated Jan 2008, this document includes an overview of records collected across the
globe, including a breakdown of Digital Network Intelligence (DNI) and Dial Number
Recognition (DNR) records collected by country. A pop-up detail shows that 203,190,032
records have been collected in the United States.
NSA 7: This document contains collection information for the United States, including
project names, the top 5 projects, the top 5 validator IDs, and the top 5 IP addresses.
NSA 8: This chart shows collection information for France for the last 30 days, including a
graph broken down by day, the most volume and the top 5 techs.
NSA 9: A review of October through December 2011, this document discusses CNE access
to Belgacom GRX Operator.
NSA 10: This document discusses VALIDATOR, a backdoor access program under FOXACID
that targets Windows computers.
NSA 11: This document discusses OLYMPUSFIRE, a software implant on Windows PC that
provides the NSA 24/7 access to the targeted computers.
NSA 12: QUANTUM, another program within the NSA’s surveillance program, is targeted
for yahoo, Facebook, and static IP systems. A list of realms it can target is included.
*

All documents received from TheIntercept.com
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NSA 13A, NSA 13B, NSA 13C, NSA 13D, NSA 13E, NSA 13F: These documents contain
illustrations how QUANTUM works.
NSA 14: Another slide about QUANTUM, this document contains information on who can
use the program and how targets are selected.
NSA 15: Also about QUANTUM, this slide explains how to exploit web browsing with
QUANTUM.
NSA 16A, NSA 16B, NSA 16C, NSA 16D, NSA 16E, NSA 16F: These documents contain
technical information about how to collect data using QUANTUM.
NSA 17: This document discusses QUANTUMNATION and how it works.
NSA 18A, NSA 18B: These documents contain technical information for using FOXACID.
NSA 19: A graph showing collection information for Poland over the last 30 days, including
a breakdown by days, the most information collected, and the top 5 techs.
NSA 20: This PowerPoint slide shows the corporate cooperators and discusses same-day
cooperation between the NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center (NTOC) and the FBI.
NSA 21: This PowerPoint slide also shows the corporate cooperators and contains a
graphic demonstrating how the NSA program works.
NSA 22: This PowerPoint slide shows NSA Based Reporting June 2011-May 2012.
NSA 23: This PowerPoint Presentation is an overview of NSA and how it works with the
help of corporate collaborators.
NSA 24: A week in the life of NSA reporting, this document shows a sampling of reporting
topics from February 2-8, 2013 for Mexico, Japan, and Venezuela.
NSA 25: This affidavit demonstrates how information collected through the use of
dataveillance was used in a domestic criminal trial.
NSA 26: This PowerPoint presentation contains an overview of the AURORAGOLD
program: “The mission of the AURORAGOLD (AG) project is to maintain data about
international GSM/UMTS networks for the Wireless Portfolio Program Office (WPMO), the
Target Technology Trends Center (T3C/SG4), and their customers. Analysis of this data
supports: a) An understanding of the current state, b) Trending, or time-series analysis,
from the past through to the future, and c) Forecasting of the evolution of global
GSM/UMTS-based networks.”
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NSA 27: A PowerPoint presentation on AURORAGOLD, this contains future technology
trends, illustrations of how AURORAGOLD works, and goals for future data collection with
AURORAGOLD.
NSA 28: The AURORAGOLD working aid, this document contains technical information for
using the program.
NSA 29: Designed for the SIGDEV conference in June 2012, this presentation contains
information about AURORAGOLD and why it should be more broadly used.
NSA 30: This document contains the DTI’s strategic accomplishments for 2013
NSA 31: This short memo addresses large router hacking and enumerates ways in which
this ability can aid surveillance.
NSA 32: This presentation demonstrates the acceleration of technology; detecting Network
Operation Centers (NOC) is now automated.
NSA 33: This presentation serves as a “roundtable,” discussing ways to improve data
collection.
NSA 34: Titled Mobile Networks in MyNOC World, this presentation contains technical
information, a picture of Prince Charles and Camilla attending a presentation, and also
evidence of collaboration to enable better exploitation of Belgacom.
NSA 35: This report discusses NSA invisibility across 18 programs, including several antivirus softwares.
NSA 36: Titled IR.21 – A Technology Warning Mechanism, this presentation discusses
emerging models for trends and forecasting, wireless evolution paths, analytic frameworks,
and AURORAGOLD.
NSA 37: This memo is about sharing metadata beyond the NSA.
NSA 38: This document is for employees being “indoctrinated” on SENTRYEAGLE, and
contains information about that program.
NSA 39: This is an administrator’s guide for Hacking Team: “The Hacking Suite for
Governmental Interception.”
NSA 40: This is a system administrator’s guide for Hacking Team: “The Hacking Suite for
Governmental Interception.”
NSA 41: This is an analyst’s guide for Hacking Team: “The Hacking Suite for Governmental
Interception.”

72

NSA 42: This is a technician’s guide for Hacking Team: “The Hacking Suite for
Governmental Interception.”
NSA 43: This presentation addresses sharing communications across the U.S. Intelligence
community, a program called ICREACH.
NSA 44: This document celebrates the first-ever collection of a 4G Cellular signal, in 2010.
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